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Considering the very large volume of work produced by Castells, the relative scarcity of secondary litera-
ture discussing his theories is somewhat surprising. Castells does not really try to situate his theories 
about the network society in relation to Marxism. The argument of this paper is that Castells provides a 
plausible account of some major features of the means of production in the contemporary phase of capi-
talism, and also of the effects of this on society more generally. His theories could form the basis of an 
academically respectable version of historical materialism. Some problems with his theories are dis-
cussed. 
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Introduction 
Castells started as a political exile from Franco’s Spain but 
soon sprang to fame as a lecturer in Paris specializing in urban 
issues. At the beginning of his career he undoubtedly adopted a 
version of Althusserian Marxism, and was dismissed from his 
post at Paris X University, Nanterre for his role in the events of 
May 1968 (Castells, 1977, 1972). He was then employed in-
stead at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, and 
1979 became a professor at the University of Berkeley, Cali-
fornia. He has recently moved to the University of Catalonia. 
The high point of his theoretical trajectory and 25 books is 
undoubtedly the trilogy: The Information Age: Economy, So-
ciety and Culture (Castells, 1996, 2004, 2000). 
Castells undoubtedly started from a Marxist framework, but 
he now does not claim that his approach is Marxist, and does 
not particularly try to draw Marxist conclusions from it. How-
ever, the central logic of his approach is to link a change in the 
mode of production to widespread general change in society, 
which is a distinctively Marxist way to look at things. His basic 
idea is that in the last 30 years or so of the 20th century there 
was a fundamental shift in the way in which the capitalist mode 
of production operates. The new social structure he terms in-
formationalism (Castells, 1996) In the industrial mode of de-
velopment the main source of productivity lies in introducing 
new energy sources or using them in different places. In the 
informational mode of development the source of productivity 
lies in knowledge generation, processing and communication. 
Information processing is focused on improving the technology 
of information processing. There the chief aim is the production 
of knowledge (Castells, 1996, p. 17).  
Informational capitalism has two fundamental distinctive 
features: it is global, and it is structured to a large extent around 
a network of financial flows. Capital works globally as a unit in 
real time (Castells, 1996, p. 471). “Financial capital needs··· for 
its operation···knowledge and information generated and en-
hanced by information technology. This is the concrete mean-
ing of the articulation between the capitalist mode of produc-
tion and the informational mode of development” (Castells, 
1996, p. 472). 
This new form of society is based on networks. “Networks 
are the fundamental stuff of which new organizations are and 
will be made” (Castells, 1996, p. 168). The networked enter-
prise is: “that specific form of enterprise whose system of 
means is constituted by the intersection of segments of auto-
nomous systems of goals” (Castells, 1996 p. 171). “The net-
work enterprise makes material the culture of the informational/ 
global economy: it transformed signals into commodities by 
processing knowledge” (Castells, 1996, p. 172). “My hypothe-
sis is that, as the process of globalisation progresses, organiza-
tional forms evolve from multinational enterprises to interna-
tional networks” (Castells, 1996, p. 192). Information-proces- 
sing is central to the new configuration of the mode of produc-
tion: 
Computer software, video production, microelectronics de-
sign, biotechnology based agriculture, and so on, and many 
other critical processes characteristic of advanced economies, 
merge inextricably the informational content with the material 
support of the product, which makes it impossible to distin-
guish the boundaries between “goods” and “services” (Castells, 
1996, p. 205). 
Who are the capitalists in this new set up? Not the legal own- 
ers of the means of production. Some actors at the top of this 
global capitalist system are indeed managers, as with Japanese 
corporations. Others could be identified under the traditional 
category of the bourgeoisie as in the overseas Chinese business 
networks. In United States there is a mixture of traditional 
bankers, nouveau riche speculators, self-made geniuses turned 
entrepreneurs, global tycoons and multinational managers.  
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Some public corporations are capitalist actors. In Russia we 
have the survivors of the communist nomenclatura competing 
with wild young capitalists. “And all over the world, money- 
laundering from miscellaneous criminal businesses flows to-
wards this mother of all accumulations that is the global finan-
cial network” (Castells, 1996, p. 473). There is not a global 
capitalist class, but there is an integrated global capital network. 
“While capitalism still rules, capitalists are randomly incarnated, 
and the capitalist classes are restricted to specific areas of the 
world where they prosper as appendixes to a mighty whirlwind 
which manifests its will by spread points and futures options 
ratings in the global flashes of computer screens” (Castells, 
1996, p. 474).  
Castells sees this new economy as inimical to organized la-
bor, and says relatively little about a working class response to 
the changed situation: “Under the conditions of the network 
society, capital is globally coordinated, Labor is individualized. 
The struggle between diverse capitalists and miscellaneous 
working classes is subsumed into the more fundamental oppo-
sition between the bare logic of capital flows and the cultural 
values of human experience” (Castells, 1996, p. 476). 
The central role of information processing in the new devel-
opment of the capitalist mode of production makes it possible 
for money to be shifted around the world with extreme rapidity 
and also for technology and manufacturing to move between 
states and to be coordinated at a distance. What is developing is 
no less than a global economy: “A global economy is··· an eco- 
nomy with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a pla-
netary scale (Castells’ emphasis)” (Castells, 1996, p. 92). An 
illustration of this development is that the share of trans-border 
financial flows for major market economies increased by a 
factor of about 10 in 1980-1992 (Castells, 1996, p. 93).  
Castells acknowledges that the economy is not yet fully 
global:  
Markets, even for strategic industries and major firms, are 
still far away from being fully integrated; capital flows are re-
stricted by currency and banking regulations (although the off-
shoring of financial centers and the prevalence of computer 
transactions tend to increasingly circumvent such regulations); 
the mobility of labor is undermined by immigration controls 
and people’s xenophobia (Castells, 1996, p. 97). 
In order to seriously come to terms with Castells’ analysis, it 
would be necessary to get to grips with his use of the term 
“network”. It makes sense for rapid computerized exchanges of 
information as part of financial dealings or of dispersed manu-
facturing and design across the globe or of lateral exchanges of 
information and ideas between people at the same level in dif-
ferent enterprises. There is also nothing wrong with arguing 
that the core of the global economy is located in the USA, Ja-
pan and Western Europe; although with the rise of China and 
India this will doubtless change. But to describe this triadic 
dominance as a “network” seems inappropriate. However, Cas-
tells is much more plausible when he claims that this new eco-
nomic pattern based on information is having enormous effects 
on advanced societies, what would have been described as 
Third World countries, played a major role in the fall of the 
Soviet Union, and is linked to substantial changes in class 
structure, the decline of the patriarchal family, the role of poli-
tics and the media, the form taken by social movements and 
new opportunities for organized crime. 
Many of the developments since 1970 that Castells is ana-
lyzing have featured in the work of other writers, and are fre-
quently described as a shift from Fordism to post Fordism, or as 
the ineluctable rise of globalisation. Many other writers give an 
account of globalisation which incorporates substantial out-
sourcing, rapid financial flows, increased inequality within the 
advanced countries matched by increased global inequality, 
power exerted over thousands of people in one continent by 
decisions made in another, the triumph of neoliberalism (Held 
& McGrew, 2001, p. 4; McGrew, 1997, p. 8; Giddens, Jameson, 
& Wallerstein, quoted in Beynon & Dunkerley, 2000; Gill, 
1995, p. 406). To some extent this type of description can be 
regarded as an empirical account of changes. The interesting 
feature of Castells’ work is that the central mechanism of the 
change is a technological one, i.e. the development of informa-
tion technology. How does this link with historical material-
ism? 
I have argued elsewhere that several interpretations of his-
torical materialism are possible. The version that makes the best 
link with Castells, and which has good links to many appropri-
ate places in Marx, is technological determinism, most ably 
defended in the work of Jerry Cohen (Cohen, 1978). Cohen’s 
account is a subtle and well-argued elaboration of the famous 
quotation from Marx’s The Poverty of Philosophy: “[t]he hand- 
mill gives you society with the feudal lord, the steam-mill, so-
ciety with the industrial capitalist” (Marx & Engels 1975, Vo-
lume 6, p. 167 the 50 volume Marx and Engels Collected 
Works, which will henceforth be abridged to MECW.). A 
number of other interpretations are possible, however. These 
are briefly described below. For the purposes of the present 
discussion I want to take Cohen’s interpretation as the starting 
point. I provide a very brief exposition and critique of the other 
approaches, with a view to demonstrating that Cohen’s ap-
proach, whilst by no means perfect, provides us with both a 
very plausible account of Marx, and a theory that can be ap-
plied to the real world of today. The other interpretations are 
less good in both respects. One particular problem with the 
interpretations which I shall be discussing below is that they 
make no direct reference to state action, but various forms of 
state action have been very important in advancing informatio-
nalism. It is now necessary to continue with a brief exposition 
of more of Castells’ ideas. 
The Effects of the Rise of Informationalism in the 
Advanced Countries 
There are very strong differences between the occupational 
structures of societies equally entitled to be considered as in-
formational. Japan and the United States represent the opposite 
ends of the comparison although in all the advanced societies 
theory is a “Common trend toward the increase of the relative 
weight of the most clearly informational occupations (managers, 
professionals, and technicians)” (Castells, 1996, pp. 217-218). 
Crudely there are two informational models: the service econ-
omy model represented by the United States, UK and Canada 
with a rapid phasing out of manufacturing employment after 
1970 and with an emphasis on capital management services; 
and the industrial production model represented by Japan and 
largely by Germany which reduces the share of manufacturing 
employment but continues to keep it at a relatively high level. 
Producer services are much more important than financial ser-
vices in this model (Castells, 1996, p. 229). 
Skilled workers in the North greatly benefited from global 
trade because they took advantage of the higher economic 
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growth and the international division of labor gave their firms a 
comparative advantage. Unskilled workers in the North suf-
fered considerably because of competition with producers in 
low-cost areas (Castells, 1996 p. 227). High unemployment is 
not an inevitable consequence of informationalism; it is mainly 
a European problem caused by state policies. In the Asian Pa-
cific overall employment has expanded substantially (Castells, 
1996, p. 257).  
Although the above is true at the global level, the conse-
quences for particular people in particular countries may be 
dramatic. “The emergence of lean production methods goes 
hand-in-hand with widespread business practices of subcon-
tracting, outsourcing, off shoring, consulting, downsizing, and 
customizing.” The social costs of labour flexibility which this 
precipitates can be high, but on the whole there are improved 
family relationships and greater egalitarian patterns between 
genders (Castells, 1996, p. 265). The ramifications of informa-
tionalism are accelerating the decline of the patriarchal family, 
which is now a minority form (Castells, 1996, pp. 196-281). 
The direct consequence of economic restructuring in United 
States is that in the 1980s and 1990s family income has plum-
meted. Wages and living conditions continued to decline in the 
1990s in spite of a strong economic recovery in 1993 (Castells, 
1996, p. 264). By the early 1990s the top 1% of the population 
owned 40% of all assets, double what it had been in the 
mid-1970s, and at the level of the late 1920s, before progressive 
taxation (Castells, 1996, p. 275). The ratio of total chief execu-
tive officer to total worker pay declined from 44.8 times for 
1973 to 172.5 times more in 1995. Some 80% of American 
households saw their share in national income decline from 
1977 to 1999 by about 6% (Castells, 1996, p. 130). The Gini 
coefficient rose from .4 in 1967 to 2.45 in 1995 (Castells, 1996, 
p. 132). Poverty has increased. The percentage of persons with 
income below the poverty line increased from 11.1% in 1973 to 
13.3% in 1997. Some 14.6 million Americans in 1991 had an 
income below 50% of the poverty level. Basically the informa-
tional economy and globalisation has caused this (Castells, 
1996, pp. 134-135). In 1999 the new economy comprised 19 
million workers while the old economy employed 91 million 
workers. Education had become a critical resource. In 1979 the 
average college graduate earned 38% more than the average 
high school graduate, but in 1999 the difference was 71% (Co-
hen, 1996, p. 136). In 1999 only 13.9% of the American labour 
force was unionized (Cohen, 1996, p. 137) - 12% in 2006 ac-
cording to Bureau of Labor Statistics—see Center for Econom-
ic and Policy Research:  
http://www.cepr.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie
w&id=1019&Itemid=138  
The change to an informational economy has put a down-
ward pressure on welfare states. Because firms can relocate 
freely there follows “the downward spiral of social costs com-
petition”. In the past the limits to this have been the productivi-
ty and quality gap between protected workers from the ad-
vanced economies and less developed competitors and the role 
of protectionism. Both of these are withering away, pushed 
onwards by the World Trade Organization (Castells, 2000, p. 
313) Mexican workers’ productivity in automobile factories 
lags only about 18 months behind that of American workers. 
Now there are similar trends in Asia. American labour produc-
tivity is still the highest in the world (Castells, 2000, p. 314). 
Castells says that in a world where economies are increasingly 
integrated “there seems to be little room for vastly different 
welfare states, with relatively similar levels of labour produc-
tivity and production quality.” A global social contract would 
be required to preserve the better welfare states, but in the libe-
ralized, network, global economy this is very unlikely and wel-
fare states are being downsized to the lowest common denomi-
nator. Finland has been an exception to this (Castells, 2000, p. 
314). To survive in a globalized economy the welfare state 
needs to be connected to productivity growth in a virtuous cir-
cle by a feedback loop between social investment and economic 
growth (Castells, 2000, p. 315, Castells & Himannen, 2004). 
The new economy generates new forms of social exclusion, 
notably of black Americans. Castells argues that there are what 
he calls “black holes” of the informational economy: “The 
fourth world has emerged, made up of multiple black holes of 
social exclusion throughout the planet··· It is inseparable from 
the rise of informational global capitalism (Castells, 2000, p. 
160).” Black Americans have problems of unemployment be-
cause they are reluctant to undertake menial labour. In turn this 
links to a higher rate of illegitimacy and a tendency for the 
breakdown of family life (Castells, 2000, pp. 143, 146). Very 
many black males end up in prison. In 1996 there were 600 
prison inmates in United States per 100,000 residents, a rate 
which had doubled in about 10 years (Castells, 2000, p. 148). 
53% of these were black. Blacks were 40% of death row in-
mates. This is largely due to discrimination in sentencing rather 
than because of the frequency of crimes (Castells, 2000, p. 
150).  
The Fall of the Soviet Union 
Castells describes the Soviet system as statism, and argues 
that the crisis of Soviet society from the mid-1970s onwards 
was the expression of the structural inability of statism to en-
sure the transition towards the information society (Castells 
2000, p. 8). Statism worked well in an industrial society. In the 
1950s until the late 1960s and the Soviet Union generally grew 
faster than most of the world. The annual growth of Soviet 
national income was 7.2% from 1950 to 1960. It was 4.1% 
1965 to 1970, 3.2% 1970-1975, then something close to stagna-
tion settled in. (Castells, 2000, p. 10). This is because the So-
viet Union missed the revolution in information technologies 
that took shape in the world in the 1970s (Castells, p. 26). 
There was a situation close to parity in computer design in the 
early 1960s but by the 1990s there was a 20-year difference in 
design and manufacturing capability (Castells, 2000, p. 30). In 
the USSR typewriters were rare, carefully monitored devices; 
two signatures were required for access to a photocopier, or 
three for a non-Russian text. There were special procedures for 
using long-distance telephone lines. The notion of a personal 
computer was objectively subversive (Castells, 2000, p. 36). 
Castells does not say this, but there is good reason to think 
that the fall of the Soviet Union is responsible for several of the 
well-known features of globalisation. The Soviet Union func-
tioned as a counterweight to the capitalist West and as a sort of 
welfare state for Third World countries, offering them an alter-
native pattern of development and source of help. The demise 
of the Soviet Union has left us with a single superpower. The 
challenge to neoliberal globalisation now rests with an assort-
ment of relatively small and powerless social movements. The 
rampant growth in inequality, both within advanced states and 
between the advanced states and others, which has characte-
rized the period since about 1980, would have been much more 
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subject to challenge if there had been an alternative ideology 
and power base. 
Marginalization of Sub-Saharan Africa 
Developing countries which have the political capacity to 
develop an infrastructure which can take advantage of the in-
formational economy can advance very quickly. Those which 
cannot are destined to languish (Castells, 1996, p. 105). Libera-
lization policies in Africa didn’t attract investment or improve 
competitiveness, but destroyed large sectors of agricultural 
production for local markets and in some cases subsistence 
agriculture. The struggle for the control of the state became a 
matter of survival. Tribal and ethnic networks were the safest 
bet for support. The struggle to control the state was organized 
around ethnic cleavages leading towards genocide and banditry. 
This is rooted in “the political economy of Africa's disconnec-
tion from the new, global economy.” The new global economy 
does not have much of a role for the African population. Pri-
mary commodities are useless or low-priced, markets are too 
narrow, investment too risky, labour is not skilled enough, 
communication and telecommunication infrastructure clearly 
inadequate, politics too unpredictable, and government bureau-
cracies inefficiently corrupt (Castells, 1996, p. 105). The per-
centage of world trade to and from Africa roughly halved be-
tween 1980 and 1995; foreign direct investment, growing sub-
stantially elsewhere, is not attracted to Africa (Castells, 1996, 
pp. 83-90). 
Africa is by far the least computerized region of the world, 
and does not have the minimum infrastructure to make use of 
computers. In 1991 there was one telephone line for a hundred 
people in Africa compared to 2.3 for all developing countries, 
and 37.2 for industrial countries (Castells, 2000, p. 92). Castells 
emphasizes the role of the developmental state in the rise of the 
Asian tiger economies. Africa has the reverse. As Colin Leys 
puts it: “few theorists of any of these persuasions [Marxists, 
dependency theorists] expected the postcolonial state of all 
ideological stripes to be corrupt, rapacious, insufficient, and 
unstable, as they have almost all been” (Castells, 2000, p. 96). 
It should be added that more recently conditions have become 
better in much of the African continent. Civil wars have ended, 
dictators have fallen, and economic development has somewhat 
advanced. 
The Asian Tiger Economies and Japan 
In dramatic contrast to the fate of sub-Saharan Africa, Cas-
tells provides a fascinating analysis of the rapid growth expe-
rienced in post-war Japan, the role of the state in four of the 
leading tiger economies of the Pacific-Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, and the prospects for continued rapid 
growth in China. He argues that there has been an important 
role for what he identifies as the developmental state. He also 
argues that the tiger economies experienced a crisis in the late 
1990s in part because they needed to make the move from so-
cieties under the aegis of the developmental state to fully net-
worked advanced economies (Castells, 2000, pp. 212-230).  
Castells and Marxism 
Enough of Castells’ account of informational capitalism has 
been given to demonstrate that it could form the basis of a 
modernized version of historical materialism. It starts from 
significant changes in the means of production which in turn 
have profoundly affected the working of the capitalist mode. 
Considerable work would be needed to analyse whether all the 
linkages along the way are satisfactory, and, as suggested above, 
Castells arguably operates with an unduly flexible concept of 
network. He does, however, manage to explain major and sig-
nificant features of the development of capitalism over the last 
40 years on a global basis. Not surprisingly, several difficult 
questions remain. The changes which Castells discusses have 
been accelerated in Britain and the United States by neoliberal 
politics, notably pursued by Reagan, Thatcher and Bush junior 
and senior, but also pursued in a diluted form by Clinton and 
Blair. Are these figures simply going with the flow, or are they 
significantly accelerating it? President Obama has a clear com-
mitment to curb some of the wilder excesses of US capitalism 
and to develop universal health care, both of which policies 
involve restraining features of the informational economy. 
These policies should be much more difficult to implement than 
their neoliberal predecessors. What should be said about the 
rise in spending on education and the NHS under New Labour? 
What about the various measures being taken by governments 
to rein in bankers in the wake of the credit crunch? To what 
extent can states and other actors mitigate the anti-egalitarian 
features of informational capitalism? To what extent can they 
resist the tendency of their economies to export jobs to China, 
India and other countries offering advanced facilities and cheap 
labour? Growth has generally been fairly steady in Germany, 
which suggests it is possible to buck the neoliberal trend. Is it 
fair to say that Castells provides us with a satisfactory version 
of historical materialism which explains some very general ten- 
dencies in capitalism, but that one would expect any explana-
tion at this level of generality to have quite a number of exceptions? 
In order to get to grips with this question, the obvious start-
ing point is to review previous interpretations of historical ma-
terialism. There are at least six of these, as can be seen from 
what follows (Cowling & Manners, 1992, pp. 9-29). As I indi-
cated above, the best of these is technological determinism. 
The idea of technological determinism as a way of making 
sense of Marx’s theory of history is best developed by Cohen 
(Cohen, 1978). It did not, of course, start with Cohen. There are 
some obvious passages in Marx which point in this direction. 
Two of the most famous are: 
The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord, the 
steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist (MECW, Vo-
lume 6, p. 167)  
No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive 
forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new 
superior relations of production never replace older ones before 
the material conditions for their existence have matured within 
the framework of the old society’ (Preface).  
Cohen’s version of technological determinism builds on pas- 
sages of this sort. He attempts to establish an account of pro-
ductive relations which does not involve legal terms, by rede-
scribing the apparently-legal aspects of production relations in 
terms of powers, which may be supported by law, but which are 
by no means identical with it. He also offers an account of the 
way the productive forces determine the economic structure and 
the economic structure determines the superstructure in terms 
of functionalist explanation: stability requires a legal expression 
of production relations. The rest of this volume is concerned 
with the further pursuit of these ideas. It should be pointed out 
here that although I have described Cohen as a technological 
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determinist, he does not use this term as a self-description. 
Nonetheless, the general approach he adopts has usually been 
seen, I believe rightly, as technological determinism, and his 
own programmatic statements do not undermine my view of 
him. In the preface to Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A De-
fense he says of his own approach:  
··· it is an old-fashioned historical materialism which I de-
fend, a traditional conception in which history is fundamentally, 
the growth of human productive power, and forms of society 
rise and fall according as they enable or impede that growth 
(Cohen, 1978, p. x).  
His main reason for avoiding the term seems to be a reluc-
tance to accept possible connotations of “determinism”, al-
though Cohen’s views about the causal mechanisms of histori-
cal materialism are clear. He says of his version of historical 
materialism that it “may be called technological, but the issue 
of determinism will not be discussed” (Cohen, 1978, p. 147f).  
This is a particularly well elaborated account, and the de-
scription of the other possibilities will be much briefer. 
One of these is economic determinism, as propounded by 
Richard Miller and William Shaw (Shaw, 1978, p. 72; Miller, 
1984, pp. 8-9). In this version the idea is that the economy de-
termines other areas of society, but there is no particular ac-
count of the relationship between the forces and the relations of 
production. This interpretation may be regarded as having cer-
tain advantages over Cohen’s theory: it specifies the mechan-
isms by which the development of the productive forces trans-
late into effective class action (a “motive” of more efficient 
production, and the means to achieve it through an increasing 
economic power base); it allows for stagnation due to revolu-
tionary failure, because the condition of a stable mode of pro-
duction is the ruling class’s economic dominance and not its 
ability to promote productivity; and it does not demand that a 
new mode of production be optimal for the development of the 
forces of production. However, the distinction between the 
economic base and the superstructure is not at all clear in this 
interpretation. 
Another possibility is an interpretation where the relations of 
production are seen as determining the economic base and also 
the superstructure. It is associated with Althusser at one stage 
and also Hindess and Hirst at one stage (Althusser & Balibar 
1970; Cutler, Hindess, & Hirst, 1975). Two particularly useful 
ideas are developed within this perspective. One is that a mode 
of production requires for its reproduction various precondi-
tions, such as the reproduction of the laborers or an appropriate 
legal framework (Balibar in Althusser Balibar, 1970, pp. 2585- 
2589). The other is the identification of transition with the 
transformation of the forces of production by the relations of 
production.  
A further interpretation, which probably actually departs 
from Marxism is skepticism. Marx is seen as alternating unsa-
tisfactorily between advocating a theory of history which gives 
an account valid for all societies and allowing the validity of 
exceptions. This leads to the view that any idea of economic 
determination should be abandoned (Cutler, Hindess, Hirst, & 
Hussain, 1970, Volume 1). 
A yet further interpretation could be called class unitarianism. 
This approach is particularly associated with historians such as 
Hobsbawm, Hilton, Hill, and Thompson. The basic idea is that 
that social and historical determination resides precisely in a 
concrete and all-encompassing unitary class experience. Most 
importantly, there is the unfavorable comparison with the base/ 
superstructure model which posits the economy as the deter-
minative basis of class as well as of society, and thereby justi-
fies the centrality of class analysis; by contrast, in unitarian 
theory class is the determinative basis of society, but there is no 
justification for this determination, only the sporadic and sub-
jective self-consciousness of class members and an empiricist 
intuition of the objectivity of class existence. Despite its appeal 
for historians whose task it is to apply the general principles of 
historical materialism to an analysis of concrete history, this 
theoretical paradox severely undermines the class unitarian 
approach. 
Moving on, there is an interpretation based on the idea of 
praxis (Jakubowski, 1990, p. 37; Gramsci, 1971, p. 372). This 
approach emphasises that history is determined by conscious 
and creative human activity. Despite its association with Anto-
nio Gramsci, this approach suffers from a considerable degree 
of vagueness. It leads Gramsci in the direction of relativism and 
idealism. 
Finally we come to the idea of an organic totality (Rader, 
1979). This approach which is developed by Melvin Rader and 
Bertell Ollman emphasizes that Marx’s central concepts are 
importantly internally related, citing the problem that science, 
law and property belong to both the base and the superstructure 
(Rader, 1979, pp. 119-120). I do not consider that Marx’s con-
cepts are as tightly internally related as this approach suggests. 
It is also not entirely clear where it leads. Thinking about a 
human organism, we can easily do without hair; people can 
manage without feet, although life becomes much more diffi-
cult. Readers may like to continue with this grisly conceptual 
experiment and then see if it can be applied to society. It seems 
to me that the overall result is relatively vague. 
The most plausible way of linking Castells and historical 
materialism can be developed from the Cohen approach out-
lined above. The advance from one mode of production to 
another occurs partly because the discarded mode of production 
has started to act as a fetter on the forces of production, and 
partly because a revolutionary class is committed to introducing 
a new mode of production. Castells considers that the informa-
tional mode of production divides and weakens the working 
class to the extent that he does not really use this term. He 
therefore has virtually nothing to say about class struggle. 
However, this plainly remains an aspect of economic and polit-
ical life in both advanced and developing countries. It is not the 
informational economy on its own which is opposing health 
reforms in the United States; there is a right wing coalition 
involving parts of the Republican Party and those with an eco-
nomic interest in preserving the status quo. 
Again, there is presumably some flexibility in the way an in-
formational economy operates. Consider the above discussion 
of the way in which black American males are socially ex-
cluded and imprisoned at a rate much higher than appears war-
ranted by their numbers in the population or their behaviour. It 
does not seem to me impossible that the harm reduction ap-
proach to drugs which is currently implemented in various 
forms in Switzerland, Holland, Portugal and increasingly in 
some Latin American countries, might spread to the United 
States. If this was matched with a determination to make better 
use of African American males, there is surely no overwhelm-
ing interest in maintaining the current very high rates of impri-
sonment. Other countries which have survived the move to an 
informational economy tolerably well manage with much lower 
rates of imprisonment. 
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Although there is doubtless some flexibility in a world cha-
racterized by informational capitalism, it needs to be recog-
nized that the forces of production are currently developing 
extremely rapidly, so it is not realistic to expect massive prole-
tarian discontent at capitalist stagnation. This can be seen in 
relation to the current situation in regard to the so-called de-
clining rate of profit. Marx argues that as capitalism develops 
each worker is matched by an increasing mass of machinery. 
This means that the value of the machinery outstrips that of the 
workers’ wages, but according to the labour theory of value the 
sole source of value is labour. The rate of profit therefore tends 
to decline over time. Although this looks plausible when one 
thinks about each worker typically being linked to an increasing 
quantity of machinery, the relevant issue is the relative value of 
the machinery. The role of computers over the last 50 years or 
so illustrates this point dramatically. Back in the 1960s com-
puters were so expensive that it was felt necessary to operate 
them 24 hours a day. This is not now necessary. The most 
commonly quoted way of expressing this advance is Moore’s 
Law, which states that the number of transistors on an inte-
grated circuit will double every 18 months, and which also 
translates into a rapid advance in computing power per unit cost 
(Wikipedia, Moore’s law). The cost of hard drive space per 
megabyte fell from $10,000 US in 1956 to about one cent by 
the year 2000, and has continued to fall rapidly since that time  
(http://www.littletechshoppe.com/ns1625/winchest.html). This 
rapid fall in the cost of computing power has also reduced the 
cost and enhanced the efficiency of a wide variety of machinery 
used in production. Thus the common sense idea of the in-
creased role of machinery leading to a falling rate of profit has 
not merely a logical flaw, but has also dramatically failed to 
work in the real world for the last 50 years or so. Obviously, 
along with this has gone a spectacular development of comput-
er applications. One tiny example amongst many is the devel-
opment of voice dictation to computers, which now works quite 
well but which would have been entirely impossible using the 
most powerful desktop computers of 25 years ago. I started 
doing word processing in the 1980s using the university’s 
mainframe computer, which had 2.8 MB of RAM. My desktop 
computer now has 16 GB of RAM. The application of comput-
ers to production, together with the developing capacities of 
China and India, have led to a dramatic cheapening of all kinds 
of products. This in turn must be at least part of the explanation 
for the relative quiescence of working people. 
Marx’s account of historical materialism is, of course, linked 
to the idea of socialist revolution. What sort of socialist politics 
can be pursued in a globalizing world of informational capital-
ism? Traditional Communist politics, meaning political strate-
gies intended to introduce an economy and system of govern-
ment similar to that in the former Soviet Union, looks particu-
larly unattractive. To go through all the pain and bloodshed 
involved in revolution, likely intervention, and isolation in or-
der to produce a system which cannot keep up with informa-
tional capitalism and which is likely to collapse does not make 
any sense. Similarly, strategies based on social democracy but 
which put the accent on changes within a nation state and 
which aim to secure a substantial degree of isolation from the 
global economy such as the Alternative Economic Strategy 
advocated in Britain by the Labour left in the 1980s do not look 
at all promising. There are plainly benefits from, for example, 
trade with China or the export of technologically advanced 
products such as pharmaceuticals which would be jeopardized 
by such an approach. Moreover, as Castells points out, people 
who make their living through working in the advanced coun-
tries are becoming increasingly divided between skilled and 
unskilled labour. These divisions amongst working people are 
fairly slight compared to the gap between low pay or welfare 
benefits in the advanced countries and rates of low skilled pay 
in countries such as China and India. Thus it is certainly a 
scandal that the chief executive of Wal-Mart is paid 871 times 
as much per hour as the $9.68 average hourly pay of US Wal- 
Mart employees, and even more of a scandal that he gets about 
50,000 times as much per hour as garment workers in China 
and Bangladesh working for Wal-Mart subcontractors on $0.17 
per hour. However, this still leaves a gap between the noto-
riously underpaid US Wal-Mart employees and the Chinese 
garment workers such that the Wal-Mart workers are paid about 
57 times as much as the Chinese workers (Anderson, 2005 at: 
http://www.ips-dc.org/projects/global_econ/Wal-mart_pay_gap
.pdf 2005). This is a bigger gap than that between average chief 
executive pay and average pay of workers in the United States 
in 1973, when chief executives earned 44 times as much as 
workers. The gap between capitalists and workers is not, of 
course, normally expressed as a gap in pay, but the gap in pay 
would certainly be part of the reason that workers and chief 
executives would be assigned to different classes. Even if one 
focuses on minimum wage Wal-Mart employees and assumes 
that these are particularly unlucky Chinese workers who could 
be paid double what they are getting if they moved to a better 
employer there is still a massive gap. 
If we can talk about a global proletariat it is plainly a very 
divided one. Some sort of worldwide Trotskyist revolution 
looks just as unlikely as its Stalinist rival. Actions to produce 
rough equality between workers in the Third World and those 
in advanced countries are likely to be resisted by the latter. On 
the other hand there is at least a degree of common interest on a 
range of issues: reasonable working conditions including both 
hours and health and safety, at least a minimum level of welfare 
state provisions, corporate responsibility and transparency, be- 
ing able to join an independent trade union, some degree of 
protection for the environment and the avoidance of global 
warming. The interests of working people worldwide are not 
served by imperialist adventures such as the recent American 
and British occupation of Iraq. If Chinese and Indian growth 
rates continue to be close to double digits while those in the 
advanced countries are more modest the gap between wages 
should lessen over time. In the meanwhile there is scope for 
trade union and political lobbying to try to bring about mini-
mum standards. A contemporary example would be the January 
2007 lobbying of the World Economic Forum in Davos by 
trade union leaders seeking corporate responsibility. (See:  
http://www.ituc-csi.org/spip.php?article604). There is also a 
role for non-governmental organizations such as those involved 
in the campaign to Make Poverty History (Castells, 2004, p. 
331). Some of what are generally seen as anti-globalisation pro- 
testers have objectives which are fully compatible with a so-
cialist agenda. None of this is as inspiring as the revolution 
predicted and strived for by Marx, but it does suggest that so-
cialism is not entirely dead. There is some scope for socialist 
initiatives which are going with the grain of history.  
Conclusion 
Although his theories need considerable further development, 
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Castells offers an account of contemporary reality which is 
highly plausible. Cohen’s interpretation of historical material-
ism provides a plausible account of Marx which is also capable 
of being applied to developments in the real world. The above 
article demonstrates that it can be linked to the ideas of Castells. 
What emerges is a plausible account of the real world which 
can be linked to historical materialism. It also links well with 
much contemporary writing on globalisation. Marx is by no 
means entirely vindicated; in particular, his account of socialist 
revolution, which is linked to historical materialism, does not 
currently look plausible in its original form. However, the ove- 
rall picture which emerges is a surprisingly respectable version 
of historical materialism. 
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